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OpenCorvus

Expert Squad trust model

The verification boundary from signed publication pointer and catalog through downloaded bytes to client installation, and what it does not certify.

Trust here does not come from a badge. It comes from a chain of checks where every step is able to reject the wrong bytes, and where a failed step never silently substitutes another file.

The public catalog is signed by the OpenCorvus publication key. The website verifies the signed catalog and the downloaded bytes; the client then validates each package again during installation.

Evidence chain

  1. Bind publication identity. The publication pointer declares protocol version, publication version, expiry, resource counts, and exact digests.

  2. Verify the publication signature. The browser uses an embedded trust root to verify Ed25519 signatures. Unknown key IDs do not count toward the trusted threshold; an insufficient threshold, an expired publication, or a rollback is rejected.

  3. Verify downloaded bytes. The download action enables only after the signed catalog passes. After the ZIP arrives, the browser recomputes SHA-256 and compares it against the content-addressed record.

  4. Repeat strict validation in the client. Import rechecks the archive, manifest, identity, paths, reference closure, workflow topology, and content digest. The client does not trust the website’s verdict.

  5. Keep install separate from activation. The Manager writes atomically under an explicit scope and returns a receipt. Installation never selects or activates the Squad on its own.

What stays protected when verification fails

GuaranteeBehaviour
No unsigned fallbackThe complete-bundle action stays disabled when signature, version, expiry, or resource counts do not match. There is no “download anyway”.
Wrong bytes never installA catalog or ZIP digest mismatch is rejected outright, rather than treating similar content as the same revision.
The existing install survivesStrict validation finishes before the atomic install commit or replacement, so a failure cannot leave a half-written package where a working one was.
A download cannot change behaviourDownload is not install, and install is not activation. The final selection stays explicit.

Boundary

This proves OpenCorvus publication integrity. It does not certify a third-party author.

The signature answers one question: were this catalog and bundle published by OpenCorvus, and did they arrive intact? Third-party namespace enrollment, publisher identity verification, independent review records, and a public withdrawal service are not open yet. Catalog entries come from the current repository source. Do not read the OpenCorvus publication signature as an endorsement of every future third-party author.